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| + | Furcy Madeleine1, né le 7 octobre 1786 sur l'île Bourbon (actuelle île de la Réunion) et mort le 12 mars 1856 à l'île Maurice, est un esclave réunionnais connu pour le procès qu'il intente à son propriétaire pour recouvrer la liberté. Le procès dure de 1817 à 1843, soit quasiment de l'interdiction de la traite (1815) à l'abolition de l'esclavage (1848). | ||
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| + | archive iconographique noire | ||
| + | visibilitée devant et derriere l'objectif | ||
| + | transmission culturelle | ||
| + | symbole | ||
| + | Partir des images duquel je viens pour parler de celui dans lequel je vis | ||
| + | Partir des images dans lequel je vis pour parler de celui duquel je viens | ||
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Ce que j’aimerais mettre en avant à travers ce projet, c’est le travail que la constitution d’une archive iconographique noire peut représentée. Dans sa forme, l’existence ou non de certaines images en plus d’une certaine quantité d’images dématérialisées ou lorsqu’elles existent en physique sont accidentées. Dans le fond, soit la lecture d’une archive noire en combattant l’invisibilisation de moments, scènes de vie et entendre les basses fréquences émises par ses images. | Ce que j’aimerais mettre en avant à travers ce projet, c’est le travail que la constitution d’une archive iconographique noire peut représentée. Dans sa forme, l’existence ou non de certaines images en plus d’une certaine quantité d’images dématérialisées ou lorsqu’elles existent en physique sont accidentées. Dans le fond, soit la lecture d’une archive noire en combattant l’invisibilisation de moments, scènes de vie et entendre les basses fréquences émises par ses images. | ||
Version du 28 avril 2022 à 11:15
ma recherche
FURCY - Furcy Madeleine1, né le 7 octobre 1786 sur l'île Bourbon (actuelle île de la Réunion) et mort le 12 mars 1856 à l'île Maurice, est un esclave réunionnais connu pour le procès qu'il intente à son propriétaire pour recouvrer la liberté. Le procès dure de 1817 à 1843, soit quasiment de l'interdiction de la traite (1815) à l'abolition de l'esclavage (1848). -
archive iconographique noire visibilitée devant et derriere l'objectif transmission culturelle symbole Partir des images duquel je viens pour parler de celui dans lequel je vis Partir des images dans lequel je vis pour parler de celui duquel je viens
Ce que j’aimerais mettre en avant à travers ce projet, c’est le travail que la constitution d’une archive iconographique noire peut représentée. Dans sa forme, l’existence ou non de certaines images en plus d’une certaine quantité d’images dématérialisées ou lorsqu’elles existent en physique sont accidentées. Dans le fond, soit la lecture d’une archive noire en combattant l’invisibilisation de moments, scènes de vie et entendre les basses fréquences émises par ses images.
Depuis quelques années, je collectionne des images de diverses provenances. De livres, expositions, internet, films, rencontres sportives,... Lorsque ces images m'aapparaisent, j'ai pris le réflexe de les enregistrer. Depuis peu, de les classer sous forme de tableaux où je recherche le nom de le.la photographe, le lieu où a été prise l'image et son contexte. Certaines cases de ce tableau restent vides et n'attendent qu'à être complétée.
pour la réalisation de cette plateforme, j'ai procédé en utilisant du html, les images sont issues de mes archives personnelles et ne m'appartiennent pas.
les vidéos sur la page d'accueil sont ma production personnelle et celle dans le menu sont extraites d'une playlist YouTube, nommée université libre de... YouTube.
au cours de mon parcours scolaire, elles m'ont servies de point de chutes. Me remplissant d'inspiration et d'informations.
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<div>
<h1 class='c001'>Chance, Love, and Logic</h1>
</div>
<div class='chapter'>
<h2 class='c009'>PREFACE</h2>
</div>
<p class='c006'>In the essays gathered together in this volume we have
the most developed and coherent available account of the
philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, whom James, Royce,
Dewey, and leading thinkers in England, France, Germany
and Italy have placed in the forefront of the great
seminal minds of recent times. Besides their inherent
value as the expression of a highly original and fruitful
mind, unusually well trained and informed in the exact
sciences, these essays are also important as giving us the
sources of a great deal of contemporary American philosophy.
Because of this historical importance no omissions
or changes have been made in the text beyond the correction
of some obvious slips and the recasting of a few expressions
in the interest of intelligibility.</p>
<p class='c005'>In a subject which bristles with suggestions and difficulties
the temptation to add notes of explanation or dissent
is almost insuperable. But as such notes might easily
have doubled the size of this volume I have refrained from
all comment on the text except in a few footnotes (indicated,
as usual, in brackets). The introduction is intended
(and I hope it will) help the reader to concatenate the
various lines of thought contained in these essays. I cannot
pretend to have adequately indicated their significance.
Great minds like those of James and Royce have been
nourished by these writings and I am persuaded that they
<span class='pageno' id='Page_iv'>iv</span>still offer mines of fruitful suggestion. Prof. Dewey’s supplementary
essay indicates their value for the fundamental
question of metaphysics, viz. the nature of reality.</p>
<p class='c005'>Grateful acknowledgment is here made to Mrs. Paul
Carus and to the Open Court Publishing Co. for permission
to reprint the essays of Part II from the <i>Monist</i>. The late
Paul Carus was one of the very few who not only gave
Peirce an opportunity to publish, but publicly recognized
the importance of his writings.</p>
<p class='c005'>I must also acknowledge my obligation to Professor
Dewey for kind permission to reprint his essay on the
Pragmatism of Peirce from the Journal of Philosophy, and
to the editors of that Journal, Professors Woodbridge and
Bush, for permission to reprint some material of my own.
Part V of the Bibliography was compiled by Mr. Irving
Smith.</p>
<p class='c005'><span class='sc'>Morris R. Cohen</span></p>
<p class='c005'><span class='sc'>The College of the City of New York.</span></p>
<div class='chapter'>
<span class='pageno' id='Page_v'>v</span>
<h2 class='c009'>TABLE OF CONTENTS</h2>
</div>
<p class='c006'><a href='#intro' style='color:#FFFF;'><span class='sc'>Introduction</span> vii</a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#proem' style='color:#FFFF;'><span class='sc'>Proem. The Rules of Philosophy</span> 1</a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#part1' style='color:#FFFF;'><span class='sc'>Part I. Chance and Logic</span> (Illustrations of the Logic of Science.)</a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#chap1-1' style='color:#FFFF;'>1. The Fixation of Belief 7</a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#chap1-2' style='color:#FFFF;'>2. How to Make Our Ideas Clear 32</a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#chap1-3' style='color:#FFFF;'>3. The Doctrine of Chances 61</a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#chap1-4' style='color:#FFFF;'>4. The Probability of Induction 82</a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#chap1-5' style='color:#FFFF;'>5. The Order of Nature 106</a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#chap1-6' style='color:#FFFF;'>6. Deduction, Induction and Hypothesis 131</a></p>
<p class='c006'><a href='#part2' style='color:#FFFF;'><span class='sc'>Part II. Love and Chance</span></a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#chap2-1' style='color:#FFFF;'>1. The Architecture of Theories 157</a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#chap2-2' style='color:#FFFF;'>2. The Doctrine of Necessity Examined 179</a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#chap2-3' style='color:#FFFF;'>3. The Law of Mind 202</a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#chap2-4' style='color:#FFFF;'>4. Man’s Glassy Essence 238</a></p>
<p class='c005'><a href='#chap2-5' style='color:#FFFF;'>5. Evolutionary Love 267</a></p>
<p class='c006'><a href='#essay' style='color:#FFFF;'><span class='sc'>Supplementary Essay</span>—The Pragmatism of Peirce, by John Dewey 301</a></p>
<div class='chapter'>
<span class='pageno' id='Page_vii'>vii</span>
<h2 id='intro' class='c009'>INTRODUCTION</h2>
</div>
<p class='c006'>Many and diverse are the minds that form the philosophic
community. There are, first and foremost, the great
masters, the system builders who rear their stately palaces
towering to the moon. These architectonic minds are
served by a varied host of followers and auxiliaries. Some
provide the furnishings to make these mystic mansions of
the mind more commodious, while others are engaged in
making their façades more imposing. Some are busy
strengthening weak places or building much-needed additions,
while many more are engaged in defending these
structures against the impetuous army of critics who are
ever eager and ready to pounce down upon and destroy all
that is new or bears the mortal mark of human imperfection.
There are also the philologists, those who are in a
more narrow sense scholars, who dig not only for facts or
roots, but also for the stones which may serve either for
building or as weapons of destruction. Remote from all
these, however, are the intellectual rovers who, in their
search for new fields, venture into the thick jungle that
surrounds the little patch of cultivated science. They are
not gregarious creatures, these lonely pioneers; and in their
wanderings they often completely lose touch with those
who tread the beaten paths. Those that return to the community
often speak strangely of strange things; and it is
not always that they arouse sufficient faith for others to
follow them and change their trails into high roads.</p>
<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_viii'>viii</span>Few nowadays question the great value of these pioneer
minds; and it is often claimed that universities are established
to facilitate their work, and to prevent it from being
lost. But universities, like other well-managed institutions,
can find place only for those who work well in harness.
The restless, impatient minds, like the socially or conventionally
unacceptable, are thus kept out, no matter how
fruitful their originality. Charles S. Peirce was certainly
one of these restless pioneer souls with the fatal gift of
genuine originality. In his early papers, in the <i>Journal of
Speculative Philosophy</i>, and later, in the <i>Monist</i> papers
reprinted as <a href='#part2'>Part II</a> of this volume, we get glimpses of a
vast philosophic system on which he was working with an
unusual wealth of material and apparatus. To a rich
imagination and extraordinary learning he added one of the
most essential gifts of successful system builders, the power
to coin an apt and striking terminology. But the admitted
incompleteness of these preliminary sketches of his philosophic
system is not altogether due to the inherent difficulty
of the task and to external causes such as neglect and
poverty. A certain inner instability or lack of self-mastery
is reflected in the outer moral or conventional waywardness
which, except for a few years at Johns Hopkins,
caused him to be excluded from a university career, and
thus deprived him of much needed stimulus to ordinary
consistency and intelligibility. As the years advanced,
bringing little general interest in, or recognition of, the brilliant
logical studies of his early years, Peirce became more
and more fragmentary, cryptic, and involved; so that
James, the intellectual companion of his youth, later found
<span class='pageno' id='Page_ix'>ix</span>his lectures on pragmatism, “flashes of brilliant light relieved
against Cimmerian darkness”—a statement not to
be entirely discounted by the fact that James had no interest
in or aptitude for formal logical or mathematical considerations.</p>
<p class='c005'>Despite these limitations, however, Peirce stands out as
one of the great founders of modern scientific logic; and in
the realm of general philosophy the development of some
of his pregnant ideas has led to the pragmatism and
radical empiricism of James, as well as to the mathematical
idealism of Royce, and to the anti-nominalism which characterizes
the philosophic movement known as Neo-Realism.
At any rate, the work of James, Royce, and Russell, as
well as that of logicians like Schroeder, brings us of the
present generation into a better position to appreciate the
significance of Peirce’s work, than were his contemporaries.</p>
<h3 class='c010'>I</h3>
<p class='c006'>Peirce was by antecedents, training, and occupation a
scientist. He was a son of Benjamin Peirce, the great
Harvard mathematician, and his early environment, together
with his training in the Lawrence Scientific School,
justified his favorite claim that he was brought up in a
laboratory. He made important contributions not only in
mathematical logic but also in photometric astronomy,
geodesy, and psychophysics, as well as in philology. For
many years Peirce worked on the problems of geodesy, and
his contribution to the subject, his researches on the pendulum,
was at once recognized by European investigators
in this field. The International Geodetic Congress, to
<span class='pageno' id='Page_x'>x</span>which he was the first American representative, gave unusual
attention to his paper, and men like Cellerier and
Plantamour acknowledged their obligations to him.<a id='r1' /><a href='#f1' class='c011'><sup>[1]</sup></a></p>
<p class='c005'>This and other scientific work involving fine measurement,
with the correlative investigations into the theory
of probable error, seem to have been a decisive influence
in the development of Peirce’s philosophy of chance.
Philosophers inexperienced in actual scientific measurement
may naïvely accept as absolute truth such statements as
“every particle of matter attracts every other particle
directly as the product of their masses and inversely as the
square of the distance,” or “when hydrogen and oxygen
combine to form water the ratio of their weights is 1 : 8.”
But to those who are actually engaged in measuring natural
phenomena with instruments of precision, nature shows no
such absolute constancy or simplicity. As every laboratory
worker knows, no two observers, and no one observer in
successive experiments, get absolutely identical results. To
the men of the heroic period of science this was no difficulty.
They held unquestioningly the Platonic faith that nature
was created on simple geometric lines, and all the minute
variations were attributable to the fault of the observer or
the crudity of his instruments. This heroic faith was,
and still is, a most powerful stimulus to scientific research
and a protection against the incursions of supernaturalism.
But few would defend it to-day in its explicit form, and
there is little empirical evidence to show that while the
observer and his instruments are always varying, the objects
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xi'>xi</span>which he measures never deviate in the slightest from
the simple law. Doubtless, as one becomes more expert in
the manipulation of physical instruments, there is a noticeable
diminution of the range of the personal “error,” but
no amount of skill and no refinement of our instruments
have ever succeeded in eliminating irregular, though
small, variations. “Try to verify any law of nature and
you will find that the more precise your observations, the
more certain they will be to show irregular departure from
the law.”<a id='r2' /><a href='#f2' class='c011'><sup>[2]</sup></a> There is certainly nothing in our empirical information
to prevent us from saying that all the so-called
constants of nature are merely instances of variation between
limits so near each other that their differences
may be neglected for certain purposes. Moreover, the approach
to constancy is observed only in mass phenomena,
when we are dealing with very large numbers of particles;
but social statistics also approach constant ratios when
the numbers are very large. Hence, without denying discrepancies
due solely to errors of observation, Peirce contends
that “we must suppose far more minute discrepancies
to exist owing to the imperfect cogency of the law itself,
to a certain swerving of the facts from any definite
formula.”<a id='r3' /><a href='#f3' class='c011'><sup>[3]</sup></a></p>
<p class='c005'>It is usual to associate disbelief in absolute laws of nature
with sentimental claims for freedom or theological
miracles. It is, therefore, well to insist that Peirce’s attack
is entirely in the interests of exact logic and a rational
account of the physical universe. As a rigorous logician
familiar with the actual procedures by which our knowledge
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xii'>xii</span>of the various laws of nature is obtained, he could not
admit that experience could prove their claim to absoluteness.
All the physical laws actually known, like Boyle’s
law or the law of gravitation, involve excessive simplification
of the phenomenal course of events, and thus a large
element of empirical inaccuracy. But a more positive
objection against the traditional assumption of absolute or
invariable laws of nature, is the fact that such assumption
makes the regularities of the universe ultimate, and thus
cuts us off from the possibility of ever explaining them or
how there comes to be as much regularity in the universe
as there is. But in ordinary affairs, the occurrence of any
regularity is the very thing to be explained. Moreover,
modern statistical mechanics and thermodynamics (theory
of gases, entropy, etc.) suggest that the regularity in the
universe is a matter of gradual growth; that the whole of
physical nature is a growth from a chaos of diversity to a
maximum of uniformity or entropy. A leading physicist of
the 19th Century, Boltzmann, has suggested that the
process of the whole physical universe is like that of a
continuous shaking up of a hap-hazard or chance mixture
of things, which thus gradually results in a progressively
more uniform distribution. Since Duns Scotus, students
of logic have known that every real entity has its individual
character (its <i>haecceitas</i> or <i>thisness</i>) which cannot be explained
or deduced from that which is uniform. Every
explanation, for example, of the moon’s path must take
particular existences for granted. Such original or underived
individuality and diversity is precisely what Peirce
means by chance; and from this point of view chance is
prior to law.</p>
<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_xiii'>xiii</span>All that is necessary to visualize this is to suppose that
there is an infinitesimal tendency in things to acquire
habits, a tendency which is itself an accidental variation
grown habitual. We shall then be on the road to explain
the evolution and existence of the limited uniformities
actually prevailing in the physical world.</p>
<p class='c005'>A good deal of the foregoing may sound somewhat
mythologic. But even if it were so it would have the merit
of offering a rational alternative to the mechanical mythology
according to which all the atoms in the universe are
to-day precisely in the same condition in which they were
on the day of creation, a mythology which is forced to
regard all the empirical facts of spontaneity and novelty
as illusory, or devoid of substantial truth.</p>
<p class='c005'>The doctrine of the primacy of chance naturally suggests
the primacy of mind. Just as law is a chance habit so is
matter inert mind. The principal law of mind is that ideas
literally spread themselves continuously and become more
and more general or inclusive, so that people who form
communities of any sort develop general ideas in common.
When this continuous reaching-out of feeling becomes nurturing
love, such, e.g., which parents have for their offspring
or thinkers for their ideas, we have creative
evolution.</p>
<p class='c005'>James and Royce have called attention to the similarity
between Peirce’s doctrine of tychistic-agapism (chance and
love) and the creative evolution of Bergson. But while
both philosophies aim to restore life and growth in their
account of the nature of things, Peirce’s approach seems to
me to have marked advantages, owing to its being in closer
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xiv'>xiv</span>touch with modern physics. Bergson’s procedure is largely
based on the contention that mechanics cannot explain
certain empirical facts, such as the supposed identity of
the vertebrate eye and the eye of the scallop. But the fact
here is merely one of a certain resemblance of pattern, which
may well be explained by the mechanical principles of convergent
evolution. Peirce’s account involves no rejection
of the possibility of mechanical explanations. Indeed, by
carrying chance into the laws of mechanics he is enabled to
elaborate a positive and highly suggestive theory of protoplasm
to explain the facts of plasticity and habit.<a id='r4' /><a href='#f4' class='c011'><sup>[4]</sup></a> Instead
of postulating with Spencer and Bergson a continuous
growth of diversity, Peirce allows for growth of habits both
in diversity and in uniformity. The Spencerian mechanical
philosophy reduces all diversity to mere spatial differences.
There can be no substantial novelty; only new forms or
combinations can arise in time. The creative evolution of
Bergson though intended to support the claims of spontaneity
is still like the Spencerian in assuming all evolution
as proceeding from the simple to the complex. Peirce
allows for diversity and specificity as part of the original
character or endowment of things, which in the course of
time may increase in some respects and diminish in others.
Mind acquires the habit both of taking on, and also of laying
aside, habits. Evolution may thus lead to homogeneity
or uniformity as well as to greater heterogeneity.</p>
<p class='c005'>Not only has Peirce a greater regard than even Bergson
for the actual diversity and spontaneity of things, but he
is in a much better position than any other modern philosopher
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xv'>xv</span>to explain the order and coherence of the world.
This he effects by uniting the medieval regard for the
reality of universals with the modern scientific use of the
concept of continuity. The unfortunate war between the
pioneers of modern science and the adherents of the scholastic
doctrine of substantial forms, has been one of the
great misfortunes of human thought, in that it made absolute
atomism and nominalism the professed <i>creed</i> of physical
science. Now, extreme nominalism, the insistence on
the reality of the particular, leaves no room for the genuine
reality of law. It leaves, as Hume had the courage to
admit, nothing whereby the present can determine the
future; so that anything is as likely to happen as not.
From such a chaotic world, the <i>procedure</i> of modern natural
and mathematical science has saved us by the persistent
use of the principle of continuity; and no one has indicated
this more clearly than Peirce who was uniquely qualified
to do so by being a close student both of Duns Scotus and
of modern scientific methods.</p>
<p class='c005'>It is instructive in this respect to contrast the views of
Peirce and James. James, who so generously indicated his
indebtedness to Peirce for his pragmatism, was also largely
indebted to Peirce for his doctrine of radical empiricism.<a id='r5' /><a href='#f5' class='c011'><sup>[5]</sup></a>
The latter doctrine seeks to rescue the continuity and
fluidity of experience from the traditional British empiricism
or nominalism, which had resolved everything into a
number of mutually exclusive mental states. It is curious,
however, that while in his psychology James made extensive
use of the principle of continuity, he could not free himself
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xvi'>xvi</span>from British nominalism in his philosophy—witness the
extreme individualism of his social philosophy or the equally
extreme anthropomorphism of his religion. Certain of
Peirce’s suggestions as to the use of continuity in social
philosophy have been developed by Royce in his theory of
social consciousness and the nature of the community;<a id='r6' /><a href='#f6' class='c011'><sup>[6]</sup></a>
but much remains to be worked out and we can but repeat
Peirce’s own hope: “May some future student go over
this ground again and have the leisure to give his results
to the world.”</p>
<p class='c005'>It is well to note, however, that after writing the papers
included in this volume Peirce continued to be occupied
with the issues here raised. This he most significantly
indicated in the articles on logical topics contributed to
Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy.<a id='r7' /><a href='#f7' class='c011'><sup>[7]</sup></a></p>
<p class='c005'>In these articles it is naturally the logical bearing of the
principles of tychism (chance), synechism (continuity), and
agapism (love) that is stressed. To use the Kantian terminology,
almost native to Peirce, the regulative rather
than the constitutive aspect of these principles is emphasized.
Thus the doctrine of chance is not only what it was
for James’ radical empiricism, a release from the blind
necessity of a “block universe,” but also a method of keeping
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xvii'>xvii</span>open a possible explanation of the genesis of the laws
of nature and an interpretation of them in accordance with
the theorems of probability, so fruitful in physical science
as well as in practical life. So the doctrine of love is not
only a cosmologic one, showing how chance feeling generates
order or rational diversity through the habit of generality
or continuity, but it also gives us the meaning of truth in
social terms, in showing that the test as to whether any
proposition is true postulates an indefinite number of co-operating
investigators. On its logical side the doctrine of
love (agapism) also recognized the important fact that
general ideas have a certain attraction which makes us divine
their nature even though we cannot clearly determine their
precise meaning before developing their possible consequences.</p>
<p class='c005'>Of the doctrine of continuity we are told expressly<a id='r8' /><a href='#f8' class='c011'><sup>[8]</sup></a> that
“synechism is not an ultimate absolute metaphysical
doctrine. It is a regulative principle of logic,” seeking the
thread of identity in diverse cases and avoiding hypotheses
that this or that is ultimate and, therefore, inexplicable.
(Examples of such hypotheses are: the existence of absolutely
accurate or uniform laws of nature, the eternity and
absolute likeness of all atoms, etc.) To be sure, the
synechist cannot deny that there is an element of the inexplicable
or ultimate, since it is directly forced upon him.
But he cannot regard it as a source of explanation. The
assumption of an inexplicability is a barrier on the road to
science. “The form under which alone anything can be
understood is the form of generality which is the same thing
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xviii'>xviii</span>as continuity.”<a id='r9' /><a href='#f9' class='c011'><sup>[9]</sup></a> This insistence on the generality of
intelligible form is perfectly consistent with due emphases
on the reality of the individual, which to a Scotist realist
connotes an element of will or will-resistence, but in logical
procedure means that the test of the truth or falsity of any
proposition refers us to particular perceptions.<a id='r10' /><a href='#f10' class='c011'><sup>[10]</sup></a> But
as no multitude of individuals can exhaust the meaning of
a continuum, which includes also organizing relations of
order, the full meaning of a concept cannot be in any
individual reaction, but is rather to be sought in the manner
in which all such reactions contribute to the development of
the concrete reasonableness of the whole evolutionary
process. In scientific procedure this means that integrity
of belief in general is more important than, because it is
the condition of, particular true beliefs.</p>
<h3 class='c010'>II</h3>
<p class='c006'>This insistence on the continuity so effectually used as a
heuristic principle in natural and mathematical science,
distinguishes the pragmatism of Peirce from that of his
follower James. Prof. Dewey has developed this point
authoritatively in the supplementary essay; but in view of
the general ignorance as to the sources of pragmatism which
prevails in this incurious age, some remarks on the actual
historical origin of pragmatism may be in order.</p>
<p class='c005'>There can be little doubt that Peirce was led to the formulation
of the principle of pragmatism through the influence
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xix'>xix</span>of Chauncey Wright.<a id='r11' /><a href='#f11' class='c011'><sup>[11]</sup></a> Wright who had first hand acquaintance
with creative scientific work in mathematics,
physics, and botany was led by the study of Mill and Bain
to reflect on the characteristics of scientific method. This
reflection led him to draw a distinction between the use of
popular scientific material, by men like Spencer, to construct
a myth or picture of the world, and the scientific
use of laws by men like Newton as means for extending our
knowledge of phenomena. Gravitation as a general fact
had interested metaphysicians long before Newton. What
made Newton’s contribution scientific was the formulation
of a mathematical law which has enabled us to deduce all
the then known facts of the solar system and to anticipate
or predict many more facts the existence of which would
not otherwise be even suspected, e.g., the existence of the
planet Neptune. Wright insists, therefore, that the principles
of modern mathematical and physical science are
the means through which nature is discovered, that scientific
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xx'>xx</span>laws are the finders rather than merely the summaries of
factual truths. This conception of the experimental scientist
as translating general propositions into prescriptions
for attaining new experimental truths, is the starting point
of Peirce’s pragmatism. The latter is embodied in the
principle that the meaning of a concept is to be found in
“all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the
affirmation or denial of the concept could imply.”<a id='r12' /><a href='#f12' class='c011'><sup>[12]</sup></a></p>
<p class='c005'>In the earlier statement of the pragmatic maxim,<a id='r13' /><a href='#f13' class='c011'><sup>[13]</sup></a>
Peirce emphasized the consequences for conduct that follow
from the acceptance or rejection of an idea; but the stoical
maxim that the end of man is action did not appeal to him
as much at sixty as it did at thirty.<a id='r14' /><a href='#f14' class='c011'><sup>[14]</sup></a> Naturally also Peirce
could not follow the development of pragmatism by Wm.
James who, like almost all modern psychologists, was a
thorough nominalist and always emphasized particular
sensible experience.<a id='r15' /><a href='#f15' class='c011'><sup>[15]</sup></a> It seemed to Peirce that such emphasis
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxi'>xxi</span>on particular experiences endangered the principle
of continuity which in the hands of men like Weierstrass
had reformed modern mathematics. For this reason he
began to call his own doctrine pragmaticism, a sufficiently
unattractive name, he thought, to save it from kidnappers
and from popularity. He never, however, abandoned the
principle of pragmatism, that the meaning of an idea is
clarified (because constituted) by its conceivable experimental
consequences. Indeed, if we want to clarify the
meaning of the idea of pragmatism, let us apply the pragmatic
test to it. What will be the effect of accepting it?
Obviously it will be to develop certain general ideas or
habits of looking at things.</p>
<p class='c005'>Peirce’s pragmatism has, therefore, a decidedly intellectual
cast. The meaning of an idea or proposition is
found not by an intuition of it but by working out its implications.
It admits that thought does not constitute
reality. Categories can have no concrete being without
action or immediate feeling. But thought is none the less
an essential ingredient of reality; thought is “the melody
running through the succession of our sensations.” Pragmatism,
according to Peirce, seeks to define the rational
purport, not the sensuous quality. It is interested not in
the effect of our practical occupations or desires on our
ideas, but in the function of ideas as guides of action.
Whether a man is to pay damages in a certain lawsuit may
depend, in fact, on a term in the Aristotelian logic such as
proximate cause.</p>
<p class='c005'>It is of interest to observe that though Peirce is an ardent
admirer of Darwin’s method, his scientific caution makes
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxii'>xxii</span>him refuse to apply the analogy of biologic natural selection
to the realm of ideas, in the wholesale and uncritical
manner that has lately become fashionable. Natural selection
may well favor the triumph of views which directly
influence biologic survival. But the pleasure of entertaining
congenial illusions may overbalance the inconvenience
resulting from their deceptive character. Thus rhetorical
appeals may long prevail over scientific evidence.</p>
<h3 class='c010'>III</h3>
<p class='c006'>Peirce preferred to call himself a logician, and his contributions
to logic have so far proved his most generally
recognized achievement. For a right perspective of these
contributions we may well begin with the observation that
though few branches of philosophy have been cultivated as
continuously as logic, Kant was able to affirm that the
science of logic had made no substantial progress since the
time of Aristotle. The reason for this is that Aristotle’s
logic, the logic of classes, was based on his own scientific
procedure as a zoologist, and is still in essence a valid
method so far as classification is part of all rational procedure.
But when we come to describe the mathematical
method of physical science, we cannot cast it into the
Aristotelian form without involving ourselves in such complicated
artificialities as to reduce almost to nil the value
of Aristotle’s logic as an organon. Aristotle’s logic enables
us to make a single inference from two premises. But the
vast multitude of theorems that modern mathematics has
derived from a few premises as to the nature of number,
shows the need of formulating a logic or theory of inference
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxiii'>xxiii</span>that shall correspond to the modern, more complicated, practice
as Aristotle’s logic did to simple classificatory zoology.
To do this effectively would require the highest constructive
logical genius, together with an intimate knowledge
of the methods of the great variety of modern sciences.
This is in the nature of the case a very rare combination,
since great investigators are not as critical in examining
their own procedure as they are in examining the subject
matter which is their primary scientific interest. Hence,
when great investigators like Poincaré come to describe
their own work, they fall back on the uncritical assumptions
of the traditional logic which they learned in their school
days. Moreover, “For the last three centuries thought
has been conducted in laboratories, in the field, or otherwise
in the face of the facts, while chairs of logic have been
filled by men who breathe the air of the seminary.”<a id='r16' /><a href='#f16' class='c011'><sup>[16]</sup></a> The
great Leibnitz had the qualifications, but here, as elsewhere,
his worldly occupations left him no opportunity
except for very fragmentary contributions. It was not until
the middle of the 19th century that two mathematicians,
Boole and DeMorgan, laid the foundations for a more generalized
logic. Boole developed a general logical algorithm
or calculus, while DeMorgan called attention to non-syllogistic
inference and especially to the importance of the logic of
relations. Peirce’s great achievement is to have recognized
the possibilities of both and to have generalized and developed
them into a general theory of scientific inference.
The extent and thoroughness of his achievement has been
obscured by his fragmentary way of writing and by a rather
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxiv'>xxiv</span>unwieldy symbolism. Still, modern mathematical logic,
such as that of Russell’s <i>Principles of Mathematics</i>, is but a
development of Peirce’s logic of relatives.</p>
<p class='c005'>This phase of Peirce’s work is highly technical and an
account of it is out of place here. Such an account will
be found in Lewis’ <i>Survey of Symbolic Logic</i>.<a id='r17' /><a href='#f17' class='c011'><sup>[17]</sup></a> I refer to
it here only to remind the reader that the <i>Illustrations of
the Logic of the Sciences</i> (<a href='#part1'>Part I</a> of this volume) have a
background of patient detailed work which is still being
developed to-day.</p>
<p class='c005'>Symbolic logic has been held in rather low esteem by
the followers of the old classical methods in philosophy.
Their stated objection to it has been mainly that it is
concerned with the minutiae of an artificial language and is
of no value as a guide to the interpretation of reality.
Now it should be readily admitted that preoccupation with
symbolic logic is rather apt to retard the irresponsible
flight of philosophic fancy. Yet this is by no means always
an evil. By insisting on an accuracy that is painful to those
impatient to obtain sweeping and comforting, though hasty,
conclusions, symbolic logic is well calculated to remove the
great scandal of traditional philosophy—the claim of absolutely
certain results in fields where there is the greatest
conflict of opinion. This scandalous situation arises in part
from the fact that in popular exposition we do not have to
make our premises or assumptions explicit; hence all sorts
of dubious prejudices are implicitly appealed to as absolutely
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxv'>xxv</span>necessary principles. Also, by the use of popular
terms which have a variety of meanings, one easily slides
from one meaning to another, so that the most improbable
conclusions are thus derived from seeming truisms. By
making assumptions and rules explicit, and by using technical
terms that do not drag wide penumbras of meaning
with them, the method of symbolic logic may cruelly reduce
the sweeping pretensions of philosophy. But there is no
reason for supposing that pretentiousness rather than
humility is the way to philosophic salvation. Man is bound
to speculate about the universe beyond the range of his
knowledge, but he is not bound to indulge the vanity of
setting up such speculations as absolutely certain dogmas.</p>
<p class='c005'>There is, however, no reason for denying that greater
rigor and accuracy of exposition can really help us to discern
new truth. Modern mathematics since Gauss and
Weierstrass has actually been led to greater fruitfulness by
increased rigor which makes such procedure as the old
proofs of Taylor’s theorem no longer possible. The substitution
of rigorous analytic procedures for the old Euclidean
proofs based on intuition, has opened up vast fields
of geometry. Nor has this been without any effect on
philosophy. Where formerly concepts like infinity and continuity
were objects of gaping awe or the recurrent occasions
for intellectual violence,<a id='r18' /><a href='#f18' class='c011'><sup>[18]</sup></a> we are now beginning to
use them, thanks to Peirce and Royce, in accurate and
definable senses. Consider, for instance, the amount of
a priori nonsense which Peirce eliminates by pointing out
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxvi'>xxvi</span>that the application of the concept of continuity to a span
of consciousness removes the necessity for assuming a first
or last moment; so likewise the range of vision on a large
unobstructed ground has no line between the visible and the
invisible. These considerations will be found utterly destructive
of the force of the old arguments (fundamental
to Kant and others) as to the necessary infinity of time and
space. Similar enlightenment is soon likely to result from
the more careful use of terms like relative and absolute,
which are bones of contention in philosophy but Ariadne
threads of exploration in theoretical physics, because of
the definite symbolism of mathematics. Other important
truths made clear by symbolic logic is the hypothetical
character of universal propositions and the consequent insight
that no particulars can be deduced from universals
alone, since no number of hypotheses can without given data
establish an existing fact.</p>
<p class='c005'>There is, however, an even more positive direction in
which symbolic logic serves the interest of philosophy, and
that is in throwing light on the nature of symbols and on
the relation of meaning. Philosophers have light-heartedly
dismissed questions as to the nature of significant signs as
‘merely’ (most fatal word!) a matter of language. But
Peirce in the paper on Man’s Glassy [Shakespearian for
Mirror-Like] Essence, endeavors to exhibit man’s whole
nature as symbolic.<a id='r19' /><a href='#f19' class='c011'><sup>[19]</sup></a> This is closely connected with his
logical doctrine which regards signs or symbols as one of
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxvii'>xxvii</span>the fundamental categories or aspects of the universe
(Thoughts and things are the other two). Independently
of Peirce but in line with his thought another great and
neglected thinker, Santayana, has shown that the whole life
of man that is bound up with the institutions of civilization,
is concerned with symbols.</p>
<p class='c005'>It is not altogether accidental that, since Boole and
DeMorgan, those who have occupied themselves with symbolic
logic have felt called upon to deal with the problem
of probability. The reason is indicated by Peirce when he
formulates the problem of probable inference in such a way
as to make the old classic logic of absolutely true or false
conclusions, a limiting case (i.e., of values 1 and 0) of the
logic of probable inference whose values range all the way
between these two limits. This technical device is itself
the result of applying the principle of continuity to throw
two hitherto distinct types of reasoning into the same class.
The result is philosophically significant.</p>
<p class='c005'>Where the classical logic spoke of major and minor
premises without establishing any really important difference
between the two, Peirce draws a distinction between
the premises and the guiding principle of our argument.
All reasoning is from some concrete situation to another.
The propositions which represent the first are the premises
in the strict sense of the word. But the feeling that certain
conclusions follow from these premises is conditioned by an
implicit or explicit belief in some guiding principle which
connects the premises and the conclusions. When such a
leading principle results in true conclusions in all cases of
true premises, we have logical deduction of the orthodox
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxviii'>xxviii</span>type. If, however, such a principle brings about a true conclusion
only in a certain proportion of cases, then we have
probability.</p>
<p class='c005'>This reduction of probability to the relative frequency
of true propositions in a class of propositions, was suggested
to Peirce by Venn’s <i>Logic of Chance</i>. Peirce uses it to
establish some truths of greatest importance to logic and
philosophy.</p>
<p class='c005'>He eliminates the difficulties of the old conceptualist
view, which made probability a measure of our ignorance
and yet had to admit that almost all fruitfulness of our
practical and scientific reasoning depended on the theorems
of probability. How could we safely predict phenomena by
measuring our ignorance?</p>
<p class='c005'>Probability being reduced to a matter of the relative frequency
of a class in a larger class or genus, it becomes,
strictly speaking, inapplicable to single cases by themselves.
A single penny will fall head or it will fall tail every time;
to-morrow it will rain, or it will not rain at all. The
probability of 1/2 or any other fraction means nothing in
the single case. It is only because we feel the single event
as representative of a class, as something which repeats
itself, that we speak elliptically of the probability of a
single event. Hence follows the important corollary that
reasoning with respect to the probability of this or that arrangement
of the universe would be valid only if universes
were as plentiful as blackberries.</p>
<p class='c005'>To be useful at all, theories must be simpler than the
complex facts which they seek to explain. Hence, it is
often convenient to employ a principle of certainty where
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxix'>xxix</span>the facts justify only a principle of some degree of probability.
In such cases we must be cautious in accepting
any extreme consequence of these principles, and also be
on guard against apparent refutations based on such extreme
consequences.</p>
<p class='c005'>Finally I should like to emphasize the value of Peirce’s
theory of inference for a philosophy of civilization. To the
old argument that logic is of no importance because people
learn to reason, as to walk, by instinct and habit and not by
scientific instruction, Peirce admits<a id='r20' /><a href='#f20' class='c011'><sup>[20]</sup></a> that “all human
knowledge up to the highest flights of science is but the
development of our inborn animal instincts.” But though
logical rules are first felt implicitly, bringing them into
explicit consciousness helps the process of analysis and
thus makes possible the recognition of old principles in novel
situations. This increases our range of adaptability to such
an extent as to justify a general distinction between the
slave of routine or habit and the freeman who can anticipate
and control nature through knowledge of principles. Peirce’s
analysis of the method of science as a method of attaining
stability of beliefs by free inquiry inviting all possible
doubt, in contrast with the methods of iteration (“will to
believe”) and social authority, is one of the best introductions
to a theory of liberal or Hellenic civilization, as
opposed to those of despotic societies. Authority has its
roots in the force of habit, but it cannot prevent new and
unorthodox ideas from arising; and in the effort to defend
authoritative social views men are apt to be far more ruthless
than in defending their own personal convictions.</p>
<div>
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxx'>xxx</span>
<h3 class='c010'>IV</h3>
</div>
<p class='c006'>Not only the pragmatism and the radical empiricism of
James, but the idealism of Royce and the more recent
movement of neo-realism are largely indebted to Peirce.</p>
<p class='c005'>It may seem strange that the same thinker should be
claimed as foster-father of both recent idealism and realism,
and some may take it as another sign of his lack of consistency.
But this seeming strangeness is really due to
the looseness with which the antithesis between realism and
idealism has generally been put. If by idealism we denote
the nominalistic doctrine of Berkeley, then Peirce is clearly
not an idealist; and his work in logic as a study of types
of order (in which Royce followed him) is fundamental
for a logical realism. But if idealism means the old
Platonic doctrine that “ideas,” genera, or forms are not
merely mental but the real conditions of existence, we need
not wonder that Peirce was both idealist and realist.</p>
<p class='c005'>Royce’s indebtedness to Peirce is principally in the use
of modern mathematical material, such as the recent development
of the concepts of infinity and continuity, to
throw light on fundamental questions of philosophy, such
as relation of the individual to God or the Universe. At
the end of the nineteenth century mathematics had almost
disappeared from the repertory of philosophy (cf. Külpe’s
<i>Introduction to Philosophy</i>), and Peirce’s essay on the
<i>Law of Mind</i> opened a new way which Royce followed in
his <i>World and the Individual</i>, to the great surprise of his
idealistic brethren. In his <i>Problem of Christianity</i> Royce
has also indicated his indebtedness to Peirce for his doctrine
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxxi'>xxxi</span>of social consciousness, the mind of the community,
and the process of interpretation. It may be that a great
deal of the similarity between the thoughts of these two
men is due to common sources, such as the works of Kant
and Schelling; but it is well to note that not only in his
later writings but also in his lectures and seminars Royce
continually referred to Peirce’s views.</p>
<p class='c005'>The ground for the neo-realist movement in American
philosophy was largely prepared by the mathematical work
of Russell and by the utilization of mathematics to which
Royce was led by Peirce. The logic of Mr. Russell is
based, as he himself has pointed out, on a combination of
the work of Peirce and Peano. In this combination the
notation of Peano has proved of greater technical fluency,
but all of Peano’s results can also be obtained by Peirce’s
method as developed by Schroeder and Mrs. Ladd-Franklin.
But philosophically Peirce’s influence is far greater in
insisting that logic is not a branch of psychology, that it
is not concerned with merely mental processes, but with
objective relations. To the view that the laws of logic
represent “the necessities of thought,” that propositions
are true because “we can not help thinking so,” he answers:
“Exact logic will say that <i>C</i>’s following logically from <i>A</i> is
a state of things which no impotence of thought alone can
bring about.”<a id='r21' /><a href='#f21' class='c011'><sup>[21]</sup></a> “The question of validity is purely one
of fact and not of thinking.... It is not in the least the
question whether, when the premises are accepted by the
mind, we feel an impulse to accept the conclusion also.
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxxii'>xxxii</span>The true conclusion would remain true if we had no impulse
to accept it, and the false one would remain false
though we could not resist the tendency to believe in it.”<a id='r22' /><a href='#f22' class='c011'><sup>[22]</sup></a></p>
<p class='c005'>Since the days of Locke modern philosophy has been
almost entirely dominated by the assumption that one must
study the process of knowing before one can find out the
nature of things known; in other words, that psychology is
<i>the</i> central philosophic science. The result of this has been
an almost complete identification of philosophy with mental
science. Nor did the influence of biologic studies of the
middle of the nineteenth century shake the belief in that
banal dictum of philosophic mediocrity: “The proper
study of mankind is man.” The recent renaissance of
logical studies, and the remarkable progress of physics in
our own day bid fair to remind us that while the Lockian
way has brought some gains to philosophy, the more ancient
way of philosophy is by no means exhausted of promise.
Man cannot lose his interest in the great cosmic play.
Those who have faith in the ancient and fruitful approach
to philosophy through the doors of mathematics and physics
will find the writings of Charles S. Peirce full of suggestions.
That such an approach can also throw light on the
vexed problem of knowledge needs no assurance to those
acquainted with Plato and Aristotle. But I may conclude
by referring to Peirce’s doctrine of ideal as opposed to
sensible experiment,<a id='r23' /><a href='#f23' class='c011'><sup>[23]</sup></a> and to his treatment of the question
<span class='pageno' id='Page_xxxiii'>xxxiii</span>how it is that in spite of an infinity of possible hypotheses,
mankind has managed to make so many successful inductions.<a id='r24' /><a href='#f24' class='c011'><sup>[24]</sup></a>
And for the bearing of mathematical studies on the
wisdom of life, the following is certainly worth serious reflection:
“All human affairs rest upon probabilities. If
man were immortal [on earth] he could be perfectly sure
of seeing the day when everything in which he had trusted
should betray his trust. He would break down, at last, as
every great fortune, as every dynasty, as every civilization
does. In place of this we have death.” The recognition
that the death of the individual does not destroy the logical
meaning of his utterances, that this meaning involves the
ideal of an unlimited community, carries us into the heart
of pure religion.</p>
<div class='chapter'>
<span class='pageno' id='Page_1'>1</span>
<h2 id='proem' class='c009'>PROEM <br /> THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHY<a id='r25' /><a href='#f25' class='c011'><sup>[25]</sup></a></h2>
</div>
<p class='c006'>Descartes is the father of modern philosophy, and the
spirit of Cartesianism—that which principally distinguishes
it from the scholasticism which it displaced—may
be compendiously stated as follows:</p>
<p class='c005'>1. It teaches that philosophy must begin with universal
doubt; whereas scholasticism had never questioned fundamentals.</p>
<p class='c005'>2. It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to be
found in the individual consciousness; whereas scholasticism
had rested on the testimony of sages and of the Catholic
Church.</p>
<p class='c005'>3. The multiform argumentation of the middle ages is
replaced by a single thread of inference depending often
upon inconspicuous premises.</p>
<p class='c005'>4. Scholasticism had its mysteries of faith, but undertook
to explain all created things. But there are many facts
which Cartesianism not only does not explain but renders
absolutely inexplicable, unless to say that “God makes them
so” is to be regarded as an explanation.</p>
<p class='c005'>In some, or all of these respects, most modern philosophers
have been, in effect, Cartesians. Now without wishing
<span class='pageno' id='Page_2'>2</span>to return to scholasticism, it seems to me that modern
science and modern logic require us to stand upon a very
different platform from this.</p>
<p class='c005'>1. We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin
with all the prejudices which we actually have when we
enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are
not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which
it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this
initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real
doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will
ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those
beliefs which in form he has given up. It is, therefore, as
useless a preliminary as going to the North Pole would be
in order to get to Constantinople by coming down regularly
upon a meridian. A person may, it is true, in the course
of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing;
but in that case he doubts because he has a positive
reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim.
Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not
doubt in our hearts.</p>
<p class='c005'>2. The same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion,
which amounts to this: “Whatever I am clearly convinced
of, is true.” If I were really convinced, I should have done
with reasoning and should require no test of certainty.
But then to make single individuals absolute judges of truth
is most pernicious. The result is that metaphysics has
reached a pitch of certainty far beyond that of the physical
sciences;—only they can agree upon nothing else. In
sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory
<span class='pageno' id='Page_3'>3</span>has been broached it is considered to be on probation until
this agreement is reached. After it is reached, the question
of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one
left who doubts it. We individually cannot reasonably
hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue;
we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers.
Hence, if disciplined and candid minds carefully
examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create
doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself.</p>
<p class='c005'>3. Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in
its methods, so far as to proceed only from tangible premises
which can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust
rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than
to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not
form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link,
but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided
they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.</p>
<p class='c005'>4. Every unidealistic philosophy supposes some absolutely
inexplicable, unanalyzable ultimate; in short, something
resulting from mediation itself not susceptible of mediation.
Now that anything is thus inexplicable, can only be known
by reasoning from signs. But the only justification of an
inference from signs is that the conclusion explains the fact.
To suppose the fact absolutely inexplicable, is not to explain
it, and hence this supposition is never allowable.</p>
<div class='chapter'>
<span class='pageno' id='Page_5'>5</span>
<h2 id='part1' class='c009'>PART I <br /> CHANCE AND LOGIC <br /> (ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE)</h2>
</div>
<div>
<span class='pageno' id='Page_7'>7</span>
<h3 id='chap1-1' class='c001'>CHANCE AND LOGIC <br /> FIRST PAPER <br /> THE FIXATION OF BELIEF<a id='r26' /><a href='#f26' class='c011'><sup>[26]</sup></a></h3>
</div>
<h4 class='c012'>I</h4>
<p class='c006'>Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives
himself to be proficient enough in the art of reasoning
already. But I observe that this satisfaction is limited to
one’s own ratiocination, and does not extend to that of
other men.</p>
<p class='c005'>We come to the full possession of our power of drawing
inferences the last of all our faculties, for it is not so much
a natural gift as a long and difficult art. The history of
its practice would make a grand subject for a book. The
medieval schoolman, following the Romans, made logic the
earliest of a boy’s studies after grammar, as being very
easy. So it was as they understood it. Its fundamental
principle, according to them, was, that all knowledge rests
on either authority or reason; but that whatever is deduced
by reason depends ultimately on a premise derived from
authority. Accordingly, as soon as a boy was perfect in
the syllogistic procedure, his intellectual kit of tools was
held to be complete.</p>
<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_8'>8</span>To Roger Bacon, that remarkable mind who in the middle
of the thirteenth century was almost a scientific man, the
schoolmen’s conception of reasoning appeared only an obstacle
to truth. He saw that experience alone teaches anything—a
proposition which to us seems easy to understand,
because a distinct conception of experience has been handed
down to us from former generations; which to him also
seemed perfectly clear, because its difficulties had not yet
unfolded themselves. Of all kinds of experience, the best,
he thought, was interior illumination, which teaches many
things about Nature which the external senses could never
discover, such as the transubstantiation of bread.</p>
<p class='c005'>Four centuries later, the more celebrated Bacon, in the
first book of his “Novum Organum,” gave his clear account
of experience as something which must be open to verification
and reëxamination. But, superior as Lord Bacon’s
conception is to earlier notions, a modern reader who is not
in awe of his grandiloquence is chiefly struck by the inadequacy
of his view of scientific procedure. That we have
only to make some crude experiments, to draw up briefs
of the results in certain blank forms, to go through these
by rule, checking off everything disproved and setting down
the alternatives, and that thus in a few years physical
science would be finished up—what an idea! “He wrote
on science like a Lord Chancellor,”<a id='r27' /><a href='#f27' class='c011'><sup>[27]</sup></a> indeed.</p>
<p class='c005'>The early scientists, Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Kepler,
Galileo and Gilbert, had methods more like those of their
modern brethren. Kepler undertook to draw a curve
<span class='pageno' id='Page_9'>9</span>through the places of Mars;<a id='r28' /><a href='#f28' class='c011'><sup>[28]</sup></a> and his greatest service to
science was in impressing on men’s minds that this was the
thing to be done if they wished to improve astronomy;
that they were not to content themselves with inquiring
whether one system of epicycles was better than another
but that they were to sit down by the figures and find out
what the curve, in truth, was. He accomplished this by his
incomparable energy and courage, blundering along in the
most inconceivable way (to us), from one irrational hypothesis
to another, until, after trying twenty-two of these,
he fell, by the mere exhaustion of his invention, upon the
orbit which a mind well furnished with the weapons of
modern logic would have tried almost at the outset.<a id='r29' /><a href='#f29' class='c011'><sup>[29]</sup></a></p>
<p class='c005'>In the same way, every work of science great enough to
be remembered for a few generations affords some
exemplification of the defective state of the art of reasoning
of the time when it was written; and each chief step in
science has been a lesson in logic. It was so when Lavoisier
and his contemporaries took up the study of Chemistry.
The old chemist’s maxim had been, “Lege, lege, lege,
labora, ora, et relege.” Lavoisier’s method was not to read
and pray, not to dream that some long and complicated
chemical process would have a certain effect, to put it into
practice with dull patience, after its inevitable failure to
dream that with some modification it would have another
result, and to end by publishing the last dream as a fact:
his way was to carry his mind into his laboratory, and to
make of his alembics and cucurbits instruments of thought,
<span class='pageno' id='Page_10'>10</span>giving a new conception of reasoning as something which
was to be done with one’s eyes open, by manipulating real
things instead of words and fancies.</p>
<p class='c005'>The Darwinian controversy is, in large part, a question
of logic. Mr. Darwin proposed to apply the statistical
method to biology. The same thing has been done in a
widely different branch of science, the theory of gases.
Though unable to say what the movement of any particular
molecule of gas would be on a certain hypothesis regarding
the constitution of this class of bodies, Clausius and Maxwell
were yet able, by the application of the doctrine of
probabilities, to predict that in the long run such and such
a proportion of the molecules would, under given circumstances,
acquire such and such velocities; that there would
take place, every second, such and such a number of collisions,
etc.; and from these propositions they were able to
deduce certain properties of gases, especially in regard to
their heat-relations. In like manner, Darwin, while unable
to say what the operation of variation and natural selection
in every individual case will be, demonstrates that in the
long run they will adapt animals to their circumstances.
Whether or not existing animal forms are due to such action,
or what position the theory ought to take, forms the
subject of a discussion in which questions of fact and
questions of logic are curiously interlaced.</p>
<h4 class='c012'>II</h4>
<p class='c006'>The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration
of what we already know, something else which we do
<span class='pageno' id='Page_11'>11</span>not know. Consequently, reasoning is good if it be such
as to give a true conclusion from true premises, and not
otherwise. Thus, the question of validity is purely one of
fact and not of thinking. A being the premises and B being
the conclusion, the question is, whether these facts are
really so related that if A is B is. If so, the inference is
valid; if not, not. It is not in the least the question
whether, when the premises are accepted by the mind, we
feel an impulse to accept the conclusion also. It is true
that we do generally reason correctly by nature. But that
is an accident; the true conclusion would remain true if we
had no impulse to accept it; and the false one would remain
false, though we could not resist the tendency to believe
in it.</p>
<p class='c005'>We are, doubtless, in the main logical animals, but we
are not perfectly so. Most of us, for example, are naturally
more sanguine and hopeful than logic would justify.
We seem to be so constituted that in the absence of any
facts to go upon we are happy and self-satisfied; so that the
effect of experience is continually to counteract our hopes
and aspirations. Yet a lifetime of the application of this
corrective does not usually eradicate our sanguine disposition.
Where hope is unchecked by any experience, it is
likely that our optimism is extravagant. Logicality in regard
to practical matters is the most useful quality an animal
can possess, and might, therefore, result from the
action of natural selection; but outside of these it is probably
of more advantage to the animal to have his mind
filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently
of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural
<span class='pageno' id='Page_12'>12</span>selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought.</p>
<p class='c005'>That which determines us, from given premises, to draw
one inference rather than another, is some habit of mind,
whether it be constitutional or acquired. The habit is good
or otherwise, according as it produces true conclusions from
true premises or not; and an inference is regarded as valid
or not, without reference to the truth or falsity of its conclusion
specially, but according as the habit which determines
it is such as to produce true conclusions in general
or not. The particular habit of mind which governs this
or that inference may be formulated in a proposition whose
truth depends on the validity of the inferences which the
habit determines; and such a formula is called a <i>guiding
principle</i> of inference. Suppose, for example, that we observe
that a rotating disk of copper quickly comes to rest
when placed between the poles of a magnet, and we infer
that this will happen with every disk of copper. The guiding
principle is, that what is true of one piece of copper is
true of another. Such a guiding principle with regard to
copper would be much safer than with regard to many other
substances—brass, for example.</p>
<p class='c005'>A book might be written to signalize all the most important
of these guiding principles of reasoning. It would
probably be, we must confess, of no service to a person
whose thought is directed wholly to practical subjects, and
whose activity moves along thoroughly beaten paths. The
problems which present themselves to such a mind are
matters of routine which he has learned once for all to
handle in learning his business. But let a man venture into
an unfamiliar field, or where his results are not continually
<span class='pageno' id='Page_13'>13</span>checked by experience, and all history shows that the most
masculine intellect will ofttimes lose his orientation and
waste his efforts in directions which bring him no nearer to
his goal, or even carry him entirely astray. He is like a
ship on the open sea, with no one on board who understands
the rules of navigation. And in such a case some general
study of the guiding principles of reasoning would be sure
to be found useful.</p>
<p class='c005'>The subject could hardly be treated, however, without
being first limited; since almost any fact may serve as a
guiding principle. But it so happens that there exists a
division among facts, such that in one class are all those
which are absolutely essential as guiding principles, while
in the other are all those which have any other interest as
objects of research. This division is between those which
are necessarily taken for granted in asking whether a certain
conclusion follows from certain premises, and those
which are not implied in that question. A moment’s thought
will show that a variety of facts are already assumed when
the logical question is first asked. It is implied, for instance,
that there are such states of mind as doubt and
belief—that a passage from one to the other is possible,
the object of thought remaining the same, and that this
transition is subject to some rules which all minds are alike
bound by. As these are facts which we must already know
before we can have any clear conception of reasoning at all,
it cannot be supposed to be any longer of much interest to
inquire into their truth or falsity. On the other hand, it
is easy to believe that those rules of reasoning which are
deduced from the very idea of the process are the ones
<span class='pageno' id='Page_14'>14</span>which are the most essential; and, indeed, that so long as it
conforms to these it will, at least, not lead to false conclusions
from true premises. In point of fact, the importance
of what may be deduced from the assumptions involved
in the logical question turns out to be greater than might
be supposed, and this for reasons which it is difficult to exhibit
at the outset. The only one which I shall here mention
is, that conceptions which are really products of logical
reflections, without being readily seen to be so, mingle with
our ordinary thoughts, and are frequently the causes of
great confusion. This is the case, for example, with the
conception of quality. A quality as such is never an object
of observation. We can see that a thing is blue or green,
but the quality of being blue and the quality of being green
are not things which we see; they are products of logical
reflections. The truth is, that common-sense, or thought
as it first emerges above the level of the narrowly practical,
is deeply imbued with that bad logical quality to which the
epithet <i>metaphysical</i> is commonly applied; and nothing can
clear it up but a severe course of logic.</p>
<h4 class='c012'>III</h4>
<p class='c006'>We generally know when we wish to ask a question and
when we wish to pronounce a judgment, for there is a dissimilarity
between the sensation of doubting and that of
believing.</p>
<p class='c005'>But this is not all which distinguishes doubt from belief.
There is a practical difference. Our beliefs guide our desires
and shape our actions. The Assassins, or followers
<span class='pageno' id='Page_15'>15</span>of the Old Man of the Mountain, used to rush into death at
his least command, because they believed that obedience
to him would insure everlasting felicity. Had they doubted
this, they would not have acted as they did. So it is with
every belief, according to its degree. The feeling of believing
is a more or less sure indication of there being established
in our nature some habit which will determine our
actions. Doubt never has such an effect.</p>
<p class='c005'>Nor must we overlook a third point of difference. Doubt
is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle
to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief; while the
latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish
to avoid, or to change to a belief in anything else.<a id='r30' /><a href='#f30' class='c011'><sup>[30]</sup></a> On
the contrary, we cling tenaciously, not merely to believing,
but to believing just what we do believe.</p>
<p class='c005'>Thus, both doubt and belief have positive effects upon us,
though very different ones. Belief does not make us act at
once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave
in a certain way, when the occasion arises. Doubt has not
the least effect of this sort, but stimulates us to action until
it is destroyed. This reminds us of the irritation of a nerve
and the reflex action produced thereby; while for the analogue
of belief, in the nervous system, we must look to what
are called nervous associations—for example, to that habit
of the nerves in consequence of which the smell of a peach
will make the mouth water.</p>
<div>
<span class='pageno' id='Page_16'>16</span>
<h4 class='c012'>IV</h4>
</div>
<p class='c006'>The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state
of belief. I shall term this struggle <i>inquiry</i>, though it must
be admitted that this is sometimes not a very apt
designation.</p>
<p class='c005'>The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for
the struggle to attain belief. It is certainly best for us
that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our
actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will
make us reject any belief which does not seem to have been
so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so
by creating a doubt in the place of that belief. With the
doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation
of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the
settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not
enough for us, and that we seek not merely an opinion,
but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it
proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached
we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be false or true.
And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge
can be our object, for nothing which does not affect
the mind can be a motive for a mental effort. The most
that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we
shall <i>think</i> to be true. But we think each one of our beliefs
to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so.</p>
<p class='c005'>That the settlement of opinion is the sole end of inquiry
is a very important proposition. It sweeps away, at once,
various vague and erroneous conceptions of proof. A few
of these may be noticed here.</p>
<p class='c005'><span class='pageno' id='Page_17'>17</span>1. Some philosophers have imagined that to start an inquiry
it was only necessary to utter or question or set it
down on paper, and have even recommended us to begin
our studies with questioning everything! But the mere
putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does
not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief. There
must be a real and living doubt, and without all this discussion
is idle.</p>
<p class='c005'>2. It is a very common idea that a demonstration must
rest on some ultimate and absolutely indubitable propositions.
These, according to one school, are first principles
of a general nature; according to another, are first sensations.
But, in point of fact, an inquiry, to have that completely
satisfactory result called demonstration, has only
to start with propositions perfectly free from all actual
doubt. If the premises are not in fact doubted at all, they
cannot be more satisfactory than they are.</p>
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